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ABSTRACT
To keep a system secure, all devices in the system need to be be-
nign. To avoid malicious and/or compromised devices, network ac-
cess control such as authentication using a credential and remote
attestation based on trusted hardware has been used. These tech-
niques ensure the authenticity and integrity of the devices, but do
not mitigate risks of a backdoor embedded in the devices by the
developer. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel architecture
that integrates remote attestation and backdoor inspection. Specif-
ically, the backdoor inspection result is stored in a server and the
verifier retrieves and checks the backdoor inspection result when
the remote attestation is performed. Moreover, we discuss issues
to deploy the proposed architecture to the real world.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Network security; Distributed systems
security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, network systems become complex and the systems are
constructed using multi-vendor devices. Moreover, a device may
comprisemany components, and part of the componentsmay come
from external suppliers. In such a situation, we can identify supply-
chain risks, where malicious devices exist in the system. There are
some types of supply-chain risks, for example, information leakage
from subcontractors or insufficient quality of the software. Partic-
ularly, in this paper, we focus on the risks of backdoors which are
embedded by malicious device vendors or malicious insiders in the
device vendor.
We can find news about actual backdoors, for example, devices
with backdoor such as a router [3], IP camera [4], and laptop[11]
have been reported. Moreover, it is also reported that backdoors
are embedded in the software development phase by tampering
with C/C++ libraries [5].
To avoid the connection of malicious devices, there are some
existing techniques. Network access control using a credential, e.g.
IEEE802.1X, performs authentication when a device is connected
with the network. Trusted Network Connect (TNC) [2] performs
remote attestation based on a Trusted PlatformModule (TPM) and
allows only the non-tempered device to connect to the network.
Specifically, TNC measures the integrity of the remote device and
obtains the hash values of the device, then TNC compares the re-
trieved hash value with the correct hash value in the whitelist.
Unfortunately, TNC only ensures the integrity of the device and
backdoor risks embedded by the device vendor cannot be miti-
gated. Specifically, in case that the backdoor is already in the device
when the correct hash value is calculated during the manufactur-
ing process, the remote attestation using the hash value cannot
detect the backdoor, because the hash value at device manufactur-
ing and the hash value calculated at the remote attestation become
the same.
To cope with the problem, we propose an architecture that in-
tegrates backdoor inspection and the remote attestation. At the
backdoor inspection, the backdoor inspection certificate is issued
and registered to a server. Then, when performing the remote at-
testation, the verifier retrieves the backdoor inspection certificate
from the server. The verifier accepts the device connection only
when the device is not tampered with and the backdoor inspection
certificate shows that no backdoors are found. Even using this ar-
chitecture, we cannot ensure any backdoor in the device due to
false positives of backdoor detection algorithms, but at least we
can ensure the backdoor inspection is performed and the risks of
the backdoor are mitigated.
In this paper, we further discuss issues when the architecture
is deployed. For example, to enhance security, the proposed archi-
tecture needs to be integrated with existing security technologies
such as monitoring and supply chain management. Moreover, we
discuss the concrete operations of the architecture.
In summary, our major contributions are as follows.
• Network access control architecture to mitigate backdoor
risks by integrating backdoor inspection and remote attes-
tation
• Discussion of issues when the architecture is deployed to
the real world
2 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM
STATEMENT
2.1 Scope of the backdoor
There are two types of backdoor: hardware-based and software-
based. As for the hardware-based backdoor, the malicious func-
tions are implemented in the hardware chips. Thus, analysis of
the hardware-based backdoor is difficult, but some techniques have
been proposed [1]. As for the software-based backdoor, we can ap-
ply software analysis techniques for detecting the backdoor. In this
paper, we focus on the software-based backdoor.
Software-based backdoors can be embedded mainly at two dif-
ferent phases: backdoor embedded at the development phase and
backdoor provided by malware which is infected at the running
phase of the device. In this paper, we focus on the backdoor at the
development phase because the backdoor created by the malware
can be detected using the integrity measurement of the remote at-
testation and other malware detection techniques.
2.2 Backdoor detection techniques
Backdoor detection is difficult compared to malware detection be-
cause it is hard to distinguish legitimate functions and backdoor
functions. There are a few approaches to detect backdoors. For ex-
ample, control flow analysis for detecting authentication bypass [7],
classification of binaries for detecting hidden functionalities [9],
and detection and scoring of static data comparison (e.g. fixed string)
for detecting hidden credentials (e.g. hidden admin account) [8].
There is no perfect algorithm for backdoor detection, and each
algorithm has its advantages and disadvantages. Thus, to detect
various types of backdoors, inspection using multiple algorithms
is required. Moreover, these algorithms cause false negatives, thus
we cannot guarantee no-backdoor for sure. In addition, false pos-
itives could be included in the detection results. Furthermore, the
attacker would evade the backdoor detection. For example, binary
obfuscation techniques embed dummy instructions and/or dummy
control flows, and also the firmware could be encrypted.
The backdoor detection algorithms themselves are beyond the
scope of this paper and we utilize existing algorithms. We intro-
duce the algorithms in Section 5.
2.3 Remote attestation
To check the integrity of a remote entity, remote attestation based
on trusted boot using TPM has been proposed. In the trusted boot
procedure, TPM measures BIOS, BIOS measures OS, and OS mea-
sures applications. By this boot procedure, the trust chain is con-
structed from TPM as a root of trust to applications via BIOS and
OS.
In remote attestation procedure, TPM outputs a report about
the measurement result of the entire system and adds a signature
to the report. The verifier can confirm the integrity of the remote
entity by checking the report and its signature. Specifically, the
hash value in the report and the correct hash value which is cal-
culated in advance are compared. TNC allows the connection of a
device, only when the remote attestation shows that the device is
not tampered.
2.4 Problem statement
Remote attestation and TNC based on the remote attestation are
insufficient to mitigate backdoor risks. This is because the remote
attestation requires the correct hash value as a clean state of the
device, but in case that the backdoor is already embedded before
the calculation of the correct hash value, the remote attestation
assumes the device with the backdoor as the correct state.
The problem is that there is no association between the back-
door inspection and remote attestation. Thus, the goal of this pa-
per is to propose an architecture that integrates the backdoor in-
spection and the remote attestation. Specifically, the architecture
refuses devices for which backdoor inspection is not performed
and also refuses devices where backdoors are detected by the in-
spection.
Figure 1: Architecture
2.5 Assumptions of security model
In this paper, we assume the following items for the backdoor de-
veloper and backdoor inspector.
• Backdoor is embedded as a part of software by a malicious
developer or a malicious device manufacturer at the devel-
opment phase of a device.
• The backdoor inspector can access the firmware of the de-
vice.
3 ARCHITECTURE
Here, we propose the architecture to tackle the problem discussed
in the previous section.
3.1 Overview
To integrate the backdoor inspection and remote attestation, in
the proposed architecture, the calculation of the hash value used
for the remote attestation is done during the backdoor inspection.
Then, the hash value is recorded in the backdoor inspection report.
At the remote attestation, the verifier can leverage the backdoor
inspection result by comparing the hash value retrieved by the re-
mote attestation and the hash value recorded in the backdoor in-
spection certificate.
Figure 1 shows the proposed architecture. In the proposed ar-
chitecture, there are two major steps. The first step is for backdoor
inspection and issuing its certificate. The second step is for net-
work access control using the backdoor inspection certificate. In
the following, we describe the details of the steps.
3.2 Backdoor inspection
Backdoor inspection is performed using the existing algorithms.
In this step, a plurality of backdoor detection algorithms is used to
expand the coverage of the backdoor types.
In addition to the backdoor inspection, general vulnerability de-
tection can be also performed tominimize the risks of vulnerability-
based backdoor [10].
Based on the backdoor inspection, a backdoor inspection cer-
tificate is issued. The certificate can contain the following infor-
mation.
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• Backdoor inspection result. A list of backdoor detection al-
gorithms and these results are recorded. In addition, the pa-
rameters of the algorithm are also recorded for checking
the algorithms are executed with correct configurations. In
some algorithms, the detection results are output as scores
rather than black and white decision. In this case, the scores
are recorded as the results.
• Hash value of the software. As described above, to associate
the backdoor inspection result and the software state, the
hash value of the software is recorded.
• Name of the organization that performs the backdoor in-
spection and its signature. To clarify the inspector organiza-
tion, its name is recorded. Moreover, to avoid modification
of the backdoor inspection certificate, the organization adds
a signature to the certificate.
• Name of the backdoor inspection engineer or evidence that
shows the inspector has qualifications/skills to find the back-
door. Some backdoor algorithms require manual operations
and/or final decision by the backdoor inspection engineer.
In such a case, the confidence of the certificate depends on
the skill of the engineer. Thus, as extra information, the
name of the engineer or qualification/skills can be recorded.
Finally, the backdoor inspection certificate is uploaded to the
backdoor inspection certificate server by the backdoor inspector.
3.3 Network access control based on the
backdoor inspection
The network access control is performed on the basis of the re-
mote attestation result, the backdoor inspection certificate, and
pre-defined security policies (Figure 2). Here, the prover is a de-
vice that wants to connect to the system and the verifier is a de-
vice for network control such as a switch, a firewall, etc. First, the
remote attestation is performed and the verifier obtains the hash
value from the prover. Then, the verifier sends the hash value to
the backdoor inspection certificate server. The server searches the
certificate using the hash value as a key and returns the certificate
to the verifier. Finally, the verifier makes a decision on the basis of
the certificate and security policies.
Here, the security policies can include the following configura-
tion items.
• Inspected backdoor types. To specify a requirement for the
coverage of the backdoor inspection, inspected backdoor
types are designated. The verifier compares this item and
one in the backdoor inspection certificate.
• Backdoor detection algorithms. To check whether the back-
door inspection is performed using correct methods, this
item is specified. The verifier checks backdoor detection al-
gorithms in the certificate based on this item.
• Backdoor inspection organization. To ignore backdoor in-
spection certificates from untrusted/malicious inspector or-
ganizations, the verifier specifies the organizations that can
be trusted.Only certificates from the specified organizations
are valid.
• Obligations after allowing the connection from the device.
The backdoor detection results would be grey. In this case,
Figure 2: Remote attestation sequence
the connection of the device is allowed under extra security
measures such as monitoring. We discuss it in Section 4.1.
Connections of the devices that do not meet the security poli-
cies are rejected in addition to the devices without the backdoor
inspection certificate and devices in which the certificate mentions
the existence of the backdoor.
4 DISCUSSION
The proposed architecture is simple and could be implemented, but
there would be issues for deployment of the architecture in the real
world. Here, we discuss the issues.
4.1 Combination of other security measures
The existing backdoor detection algorithms are not perfect and
would miss the backdoors (false negatives). Moreover, the algo-
rithm would output the ’grey’ result and require additional man-
ual analysis. However, the manual analysis requires cost, time, and
trained engineers. Thus, for low cost backdoor inspection, the in-
spection only by the automated algorithm can be considered. In
such cases, to mitigate risks of missed backdoors and grey devices,
the following extra securitymeasures (obligations) can be enforced
to the grey devices.
Run-time monitoring. Intrusion detection system (IDS) which
detects abnormal behaviors usingmachine learning techniques can
be performed as an extra security measure. In this case, the thresh-
old of the abnormal behaviors algorithm can be modified based on
the backdoor inspection scores.Specifically, a more strict thresh-
old is applied to the more suspicious devices. Moreover, detailed
logging can be performed on grey devices to efficiently detect ma-
licious behaviors.
Access control. In addition to the control of the connectivity dis-
cussed in Section 3.3, fine-grained access control can be performed.
For example, if one software component is grey, we can enforce sys-
tem call-level access control such as SELinux so that the software
component can only have minimal permissions for its functions.
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In addition, internal network access control such as IP level filter-
ing and VLAN level isolation can be enforced for the grey devices
in order to minimize the damage in case that the devices have the
backdoor.
4.2 Integration with supply chain management
In addition to the above technical measures, an ecosystem of a
secure supply chain can be enforced as well. For example, back-
ground checks and internal control/corporate governance checks
can be performed for the suppliers.
This supply chain information also can be recorded in the back-
door inspection certificate and used for the decision of the device
connection. For example, using this information a verifier can check
that a device is constructed using components of trusted suppliers.
4.3 Who performs the backdoor inspection?
We can find a question: who should inspect the backdoor? For its
answer, we can identify the following three cases.
• Trusted third parties. For example, the government or a pub-
lic organization inspects devices. This option is the most re-
liable but there would be a scalability issue that an organi-
zation cannot inspect all devices.
• Organizations using devices. The users of the device inspect
the devices. In this case, an issue is that there would be
no backdoor inspection engineers, especially for small and
medium-sized businesses.
• Device manufacturers. Assuming that the device manufac-
turers are malicious, this option does not work. However,
in a case that the device manufacturers are benign and their
suppliers are potentially malicious, backdoor inspection by
the device manufacturers is possible.
4.4 Disclosure of backdoor detection algorithm
To trust the backdoor inspection result in the certificate, the ver-
ifier would like to know the backdoor inspection procedures in-
cluding how to find the backdoor. However, in case that the details
of the backdoor detection algorithms are disclosed, the backdoor
developers may try to bypass the detection algorithm.
To avoid the cat and mouse game, a fact that shows the back-
door inspection is performed in specified procedures could be only
disclosed. At least, consensus between backdoor inspectors and de-
vice users (verifiers) is required.
4.5 Software update
The software of the devices are often updated for new functional-
ities and fixing vulnerabilities. In the case of the update, the back-
door inspection should be performed again. The backdoor inspec-
tion is only performed for the updated parts of the software and
the backdoor inspection certificate is also updated.
4.6 Application to secure system construction
In the above, we discuss the network access control when a device
connects to a system. In addition to this use case, our architecture
is useful for system construction. For example, when a system in-
tegrator would like to internally use a device from third parties,
the system integrator can leverage the backdoor certificate of the
device.
5 RELATED WORK
Here, we introduce backdoor detection techniques.
Some researchers proposemethods to detect software backdoors
in semi-automated or automated fashion. Schuster et al. [6] in-
troduce an approach to automatically detect and disable certain
types of backdoors within server applications. They use dynamic
analysis technique to automatically identify the specific regions
in a binary that are prone to attacks, such as authentication rou-
tines or command dispatching or handling functionalities. They
then leverage this knowledge to determine suspicious components
in a semi-automated manner. Firmalice [7] is designed for detect-
ing authentication bypass vulnerabilities within embedded device
firmware. The authors firstly define the security policy to denote
privileged operations in the program, and then utilize symbolic ex-
ecution techniques to detect whether it is possible to reach the
point of executing the privileged operations without proper au-
thentications. Thomas et al. propose two different methods to de-
tect backdoor components, HumIDIFy [9] and Stringer [8].HumID-
IFy uses a machine learning technique to classify binaries from
Linux-based embedded device firmware into functionality classes
such as web-server or secure-shell daemon. Then, it evaluates the
binary based on a class-specific profile and automatically detects
the deviations from their expected functionalities. Stringer aims to
identify comparisons with static data, which guards the succeed-
ing unique functionality. It covers not only hard-coded credential
checks, but also undocumented functionalities within the targeted
binary.
The firmware of devices is sometimes legitimately obfuscated
or packed/encrypted to protect intellectual properties. To analyze
such firmware, we can integrate existing deobfuscation techniques
with the above backdoor detection techniques.
As discussed in Section 3.2, these algorithms can be integrated
with the proposed architecture.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Remote attestation is insufficient to mitigate risks of backdoor em-
bedded in the devices by the device manufacturers. To tackle this
problem, we propose the architecture where the decision of a net-
work connection acceptance is made on the basis of the remote
attestation result, the backdoor inspection certificate, and the secu-
rity policies. We further discuss deployment and operation issues.
As for future work, we will implement the architecture and eval-
uate its feasibility. In addition, wewill discuss non-technical frame-
works such as consensus on the backdoor inspection procedure
and organizational rules. Moreover, the reliability of the proposed
architecture depends on the accuracies of the backdoor detection
algorithms, thus we will investigate these accuracies and improve
the detection capabilities.
The proposed architecture is still a work in progress, but we be-
lieve that the architecture contributes to improving the trustwor-
thiness of systems.
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